The beginning of the ı990s has witnessed enormous changes and upheavals in the struclure of Balkan politics, comparable with that of the fırst two decades of the ı900s. Socialist regimes collapsed, nationalism is on the rise in its most fervent form, new staıes emerged, ethnie wars are underway, new relaıionships are seı up, and so on. Within a very short span of time, there have laken place grcaı changes, making it difficulı even for observers to cateh up wilh developments. Yel, some characteristics peculiar to the region are stili prevalent such as the problem s conceming ethnicity and minoriıy issues, and dispuıes in the Aegean Sea. These questions stiıı play an important role in determining the policies of the Balkan states.
It has long been a commonplace to commence an interpretation of the Balkans by saying thal iı is a very complicaled area which is prone LO ardent nationalism and ethnie tension due LO its special geographical character and historical background. The area is complicated, not only in terms of ethnie, national, and religious diversity, but it is also politically very eomplex. Turkeyand Greece, both members of NATO and other Westem organizations. have problem s in their bilateral relations, particularly the long-standing Cyprus question and minority issues. Bulgaria was the closest ally of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia had been a leading member of the Non-Alignment Movement Albania was a self-isolated country, once the only European country outside CSCE, and also the only country that declared itself to be atheisı.
[VOL. XXI Apan from this polilical diversity, all of these states have minorilies in their neighbouring countries. There are Turkish minorilies living in Greece, Bulgaria, and Macedonia; i Greek minority in Turkeyand A1banil; Macedonians, a1beit theyarenot reeognized either by Greece or Bulgaria, Iive in these lwo couotries; A1banians in Serbia (Kosovo), Greece and Macedonia; a smaIl number of Bulgarians in Macedonia; Hungarians in Romania and Serbiı; and Serbs in Macedonia. There are a1so other ethnic or religious groups like Pomaks in Bulgaia and Greece, lews, Romanies (Gypsies), and Vlachs in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbil. Even this rough picture shows the complexity of the minority issues in this part of the world and explains the root of the term "balkanization". Obviously, the mulli-ethnic charaeter of these states on many occasions has exaeerbated the relations among them and prepared the ground for suspicion and mispereeption on the part of the countries that include the minority of the neighbouring state.
It should be made elear from the outset that this is an aniele that aims to analyse a certain aspect of the foreign policies of the Balkan states. i will, therefore, noı enter a discussion about the definition of ethnic, ethnieity, or even minority. The purpose of this aniele is not to invesligate the ethnic or religious origins of the peoples who Iive in the Balkans, but taking this for granted, to understand and explain the role of minorities (whether reeognized or nonreeognized by the respectiye govemments) in affeeting the foreign policies of the Balkan states. it may be argued that nowhere in the world do minority issues influence the relations of a handful of states situated in a relalively smail geographical area. In this study i will focus on the problems revolving around the Muslim minorities and will toueh upon other minority issues only when necessary.
Within the framework of this study, it is neeessary to point out some of the characterislie features of the Balkans in order to grasp the minority questions.
II. The Burden of the Past:
The [ırst characteristic feature of the Balkans is that the nations in this region stilI heavily carry what may be called the "burden of the past". That is, peoples of this area (perhaps in same other parts of the world as weıı) have vivid meillories of past events to the extent that the agonies of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, World War i and World War II, the Greek Civil War, occupations and atrocities commiued by either side continue to affeet their perceptions of the others. This may be explained by the complexity and c10seness of the diyerse ethnic and religious groups. What is more, the nearly five centuries-old OUoman dominalion of the Balkans is so carved into the minds of the Balkan peoples that even modem Turkey's initiatives in the 1990s are viewed as an attempt to revive this Empire. The terms and definilions such as "Greater Albania", "Greater Bulgaria", "Greater Serbia", "the Megali Idea". "Uniting of Macedonia". "Kosova, the cradie of Serbian nationhood" are stili in daily use on the verge of the twemy-first century. So is the resurfacing of IMRO as a political party in the Republic of Macedonia. When it is considered that the history of the Balkans is full of wars. occupations, great power rivalry, riots and raids, exoduses, struggles for nation hood, assassinations, komitacis, maltreatmem of minorities, and enmity among peoples, the picture of the past is nothing bul a bleak one. So, thaı background in mind, one cannal be astonished to see the Balkans as a conflicı-ridden region.
The Ottoman role has had an unforgeuable impacı on the history of the region. While most of the Christian peoples of the Balkans regard this long period as the darkest era of their history, Turks lake pride in their just and tolerant rule, especially when they consider the ongoing bloody conflicı in the Balkans taday. It is an histarical fact thaı the Christian subjeets of the Sultan were free to maintain and to practice their religious beliefs, and in thaı sense Ottoman rule was not assimilationist. The clear evidence for this fact is that, after five cemuries. the churches spearheaded the struggles for national independence from the Ottoman Empire. Since they could preserve their religious, cultural, and linguistic identities under the Ottoman rule, nationalist movements had grown in this region. But, on the other hand, Christian peoples of the Balkans blamed Ottoman rule for their backwardness. 1
All the countries of the Balkans gained their independence by fighting against the Turks. And ironically enough, Turkish people had to fight for their liberation against their former subjects, that is, the Greeks in [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] , to build their own modem nation-state.
Ottoman dominatian and the setllernem of Turks in these lands brought anather legacy to the region. The Turkish people left in Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, compelled Turkey to be concemed with developments in these countries. In the neighbouring countries the rights and status of the Turkish minorities are guaranteed by international treaties as are those of the Greek minority in Turkey. Besides, the modem Turkish state has not been totally indifferent to the Muslims who were converted to Islam in the Balkans (such as Bosnian Muslims and Pomaks in Bulgaria). Their cultural affinity and their immigration in large numbers to Turkey strengthened the contact between Turkeyand the Balkan Muslim populations. Turkey has been regarded as a proteetor by these Muslim peoples. In times of crisis some peoples of nonTurkish origin deelared themselves to be Turks as happencd in Bulgaria and Macedonia.
lCharles and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, New Jcrsey, Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 33. [VOL. XXI
The second characterisLic feature of the Balkans within the scope of this study is that minority quesLions are intermingled with other deep-rooted problems. For instance, minority problems are onlyone aspect of the existing problems between Turkeyand Greece. Albania and Yugoslavia had ideological fricLions, among others.
Security issues, ideological fricLions, and border disputes, have all contributed to the intricate relaLions of the Balkans states. The partition of the lands of the decaying Ottoman Empire beginning from the 19th century created grave problems for the peoples of this region who strove to form their own national states. This led to the claims of the new states over the others' territories which culminated in the Macedonian quesLion and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The two World Wars had a strong impact on the Balkans. Yugoslavia and Greece were invaded by ltaly and Germany; two other Balkan states, Bulgaria and Romania participated in World War II on the side of the Nazis leaving biner memories with the Balkan peoples.
The Macedonian quesLion in this regard deserves special anention. It is almost impossible to separate the Macedonian question from any crisis accorring in the Balkans. it is a deep-rooted question now involving five countries of the region: Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Albania, and the Macedonian Republic. The trouble over the name of lhe newly-independent Republic of Macedonia is lhe latest example. The creatian of Greater Bulgarla in the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 which gaye most of Macedonia to Bulgaria and, in lhe Berlin Congress the same year, its restoration to the Ottoman Empire caused such a resentment in this country that lhis event determined the future course of Bulgarian foreign policy at least until the end of World War II. The Macedonian quesLion left an ineradicable trace in the history of Bulgaria. Bulgaria was under Ottoman dominaLion poliLica1ly but it was also under Grcek cultural control, at least umil the formatian of an autonomous Bulgarian Church (The Exarchate) in 1870. Therefore, they had to wage a war for their political independence against the OUomans as weıı as for their independence from Greek cultural and spiritual hegemony.
A distinction is necessary between the Muslim minorities of Turkish origin and those of non-Turkish origin, such as lhe Albanians, Pomaks and Muslims in lhe Sandzak region and some section of lhe Romanies. This distinction is quite important as lheir status represents different cases both politically and legally. By and large,lhe Turkish and lhe Albanian minorities constitute lhe two biggest and most important minorities bolh numericaııy and politically. Although lhe Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria have caused great friction, lhe most sensitive of lhe minority issues in the Balkans in lhe 1990s have been lhe Albanians in Kosovo. The comman fear is that the war in Bosnia could spread to Kosova where lhe Albanians have been ruled under the fırın hand of Milosevic since 1990.
Generaııy, the atLİtudes of the Balkan states towards their respecLİve Muslim minorities foııow two ways. The Muslims of any stock in the Balkans are regarded as the remnants of Ottoman dominatian, something that reminds them of the vestiges of an alien rule, that is the reason for at leasl some of the evils and problem s they face in their lives. Although it is now not easy to disLİnguish between them, basically the Muslims in the Balkans are the descendants of either the Turks settled there af ter the Ottoman conquests such as the Turks in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece, or the indigenous peoples such as Albanians, Bosnians and Pomaks who converted to Islam for various reasons. The problem with the non-Turkish peoples is that, notwithstanding their ethnic and linguistic sameness with their conationals, theyare considered to be renegades who saId out the ir beliefs, obtained privileges, and scrved the Sultan to gain economic, advantages or for other reasons. 2
Obviously, religion has played a great role in reinforcing the naLİonal identity in the Balkans, and Muslims of non-Turkish origin have developed a disLİnct culture and life styles throughout these years, and are mostly affected by Islam and to same extent, by Turkish culture. Since the non-Muslim Balkan peoples view the long Ottoman rule in the Balkans somewhaı negatively, they view the existence of the Muslims in the same manner. As the war in Bosnia has shown quite clearly, the Serbs are teying to cIeanse the Bosnian Muslims even as they eradicate the physical reminders of a distanl pasL As far as the Turkish minorities are concerned, theyare seen as the descendants of the once superior naLİon of the Ouoman Empire. Their status has changed from ruler to ruled, from majority to minority. Certainly, the issues and problem s related to the Muslim minoriLİes in the Balkans cannol be explained merely by psychological attitudes. They have roots in history. The daily political developments, environmental factors, economic condilions, political changes, and demographic patterns all influence the situation of the minoriLİes and the relations of the concemed states.
III. Minorities and Foreign Policies:
The role of minorities in interstate relaLİons has been a neglected subject in the literature of foreign policy studies. Although the treatment of minorities attracts attention to same exıent, aıtempts at theorizing on the ways minorities influence foreign policy has not received the attenLİon iı 2George Amuis, 'The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism," Charles and Barbara leIavich, ed., The Balkans In Transition, Hamden, Archon Books, 1974, pp. 120.123. deserves when the existing conflicts caused by the minority problem s in the world are laken into accounL
The most comman case is that minorities are usually located in the border areas of neighbouring countries which hold each other's nationals as minorities. This is a fact conditioned by the events of the pası. In most of the cases "nation" and "state" do not coincide and leave same parts of a nation in the neighbouring countries.
Minorities in a neighbouring state, especially if located in the border areas, create a feeling of insecurity for the host state. This perception of threat or insecurity is enhanced in the case of problems in the relations of the neighbouring countries. Theyare usually regarded as a "fıfth" column, an entity which is alien or at least differem from the majority, having different religious, linguistic, and cultural traits. Indeed, it is true that there are many examples of the conduct of minorities acting as a fıfth column. The Kurds in Iraq and Iran, same sections of the Croats and Crimean Tartars in the Second World War, Macedonians in the Greek Civil War, and the like.
The existence of minorities in some cases enables other countries to interfere in the internal affairs of a country and sametimes to manipulate this minority. Minorities could be used as a foreign policy tool. A state that has unfriendly relations with another state can manipulate the minority whether theyare co-nationals or not, in order to weaken its rival. This may lake the form of provoking this minority, providing material support and serving as a safe haven for their armed bands.
Minorities sametimes influence foreign policy in a way that affects relations profoundly. For many years Bulgaria and Greece, though in rival military camps, have shared a comman opposition against Yugoslavia and Turkey. The existence of Macedonian and Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece has led to their rapprochement and a covert cooperation against Turkey and Yugoslavia.
A state which holds the minority from a neigbouring country usually follows one or the other of the following policies: -The fıu policy option is to pursue an assimilationist policy towards that particular minority. This option covers measures such as the ban on the use of the native language, suspension of education in the minority language, severing contacts with the mother country, forced change of names, prohibition of religious rituals and practices, conniving at the atrocities committed by paramilitary groups, etc. it also includes attempts to uproot minority links with the mother country, and mass propaganda about the ir ethnic and religious backgrounds.
• The seeond policy option is to force as many of the minority as possible to leave the country. This can becalled forced expulsion. This could be done indireetly by oppressing them in various ways, or directly in the fonn of oulright deportation.
-The policy of denial is the third option states implement towards their minorities. The states in some cases deny the existence or distinctiveness of a minority in their territories in order to i) pursue an assimilationist policy; or ii) to prevent the mother country and international institutions from interfering in the exercise of their minority rights.
States can pursue either the fırst. second or third option or even all of them at the same or different times. This, of course, creates tensions and frustrations between the minority and the state and, in many cases, results in the involvement of the neighbouring country to defend the rights of the minority. So, the conditions of the minoriıy remain a destabilising factor in the relations of the two counlries.
The most frequent case occurs when a dominant group in one state is separated from its co-nationals who make up a minority group in one or more other states. Such a siıuation can give rise to irredentism and cause aggressive and expansionist foreign policy.3 The Balkans provide an apt case both for empirical and theoreıical sludies of this sort. Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs, Turks, Greeks -all are spread over the neighbouring states, although not all of them cause irrcdentism. The existence of a minority group in a neighbouring country may give rise to intentions of annexing that part of the tecritory by the mother country. The Sudeten Gennans in the Iate 1930s or the Bulgarian invasion of Northem Greece in World War II represent appropriate historical examples in this context This affects the policy of the state both towards the minority and towards the neighbouring country.
In some other cases, each one of the states may have the other's minority in its territory, hence relations become more complicated. When there is an allegation that minority rights are violaıed by one state, the other minoriıy in the neighbouring country also suffers from maltreatment as a retaliatory action. The minorities, obviously in a delicate position and subject to oppression, fall victim ıo disputes between the states, disputes that are most of the time beyond their control and outside their responsibility. In other words, minorities may be the victims of political or other kinds of problems and they may cause problems per se. it is in times of crisis that the conditions of the minorities become really troubled. When the relations of the two states deteriorate or when the problems tum into open conflict, the situation of the minorities become very sensitive. In these cases, they may be deprived of their rights or even incarcerated during the crisis or conflict.
A nation-state is considered to consist of a homogeneous people with a comman past, comman language. comman national consciousness, comman interests and so on. In general, it may be argued that states tend to be homogeneous in order to cope with the threats. economic problem s and uncertainties of a stili anarchical world. Since the loyalty of a minority group is considered to be towards their origin country, theyare regarded to have different goals than the majority. Thus. the common perception is that the national minorities have different national consciousness and goals, and that they do not strive for the weıı-being of their country of residence, but selfishly try to seeure and promote their own living conditions. Therefore, minorities are viewed as a factor not contributing to the general weıı-being and development of their country of residence but rather as a factor that weakens its sttength, may be the soft under beııy of the country.
Furthermore, the existence of a minority means that, in the last instance, it always carries the danger of national struggle, ultimately aiming at the separation or annexation to the country where they comprise the majority. For a region like the Balkans, where nation-states are stili in the process of being established, the existence of the minorities creates severe problems. Having minorities, at the least, requires some responsibilities on the part of the host state. if the minorities' rights are not salisfied, this discontent generates other problems. putling this state in a guilty position and making it subject to crilicism before the world. if this minority has any connections with the neighbouring country, relations with that country are usuaUy adversely affected.
Therefore. states sametimes try to ignore their minorities and tend to deny the existence of minorities whose status is not recognized by treaties. Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece. and the Albanian minority in Grecce fall into this category. As for the ones whose exisıence and rights are recognized, they usuaııy have to be content with the minimum of their legal rights. There is, indeed, no necd to exemplify this case which is common both in the Balkans and other parts of the world.
Minarities, albeit rarely, can also play a positive role in interstate relations. They create a link and serve as a comman point beıwecn the lwo countries. But for minorities to play a constructive role dcpends on a number of conditions. First of all, the country that holds the minority should provide them with their basic minoriıy rights. This minority should be satisfied with their treatment by the state, and there should not be any big problems which cause tensions betwecn the minority and the state. Secondly, the state that holds the minority should be confident thaı the neighbouring state has no ptetension LO ilS ıerritory, nar any intcntion LO use the minoriır as a preıexl LO interfere in the internal affairs of the other sıate. Third, there should not be other signiflcant questions between the two states. It is, of course, not a very common situation that all of these conditions are met and particularly within the Balkans, generaIly speaking, minorities pose more problems than their contributions LOintersıate relations. lt is true that the minorities beneflt from an atmosphere of mutual trust and good relations. It is only in these conditions that minorities can contribute to the strengthening of good relations among states and that is why they generally face problem s and oppression rather than receiving humanharian treatment The situation of the Turkish minority in Westem Thrace has a1ways been a controversial issue between Turkeyand Greece and contributed to the already existing deep political and juridical issues. To give a general picture of the relations between these two countries, the problems can be summarized: The Cypros question; problems over the terrilOrial waters and continental shelves in the Aegean Sea; de-miIitarization of the East Aegean Islands; mutual complaints about the treatment of the minorities; division of the air control mechanism in the Aegean (the FIR issue-Flight Information Region); most recently, Turkey's allegations to the effect that Greece provides logistical support to the Kurdish guerrillas, though the latter officially denies such a1legations. lt is possible to say from the start that the conditions of both Turlcish and Greek minorities have been heavily dependent on the level of relations between the two countries. In other words, it is the deep-rooted problems between Turkeyand Greece that have affected the situation and the treatment of the minorities. The Cyprus problem in particular has almost been the main determining factor in the handling of the minorities in both countries. 5
The fırst contentious matter is over the name and identity of the Turkish minority. The Greek govemment denies the existence of a Turkish minority in Westem Thrace. it refers to the ethnic Turks as "Greek Muslims", or "Heııenic Muslims", or simply "the Muslim minority". It views the Turks as a rcligious minority, rather than as an ethnic or national minority.6
The Greek authorities tey to expIain this attitude in the wording of the Lausanne Treaty which spealcs of "the Muslims of Greece" and "non-Muslim minorities of Turkey". The subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been dividcd along religious lines, that is Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore, these definitions were also used in describing the minorities in the Treaty. It is apparent that the "Muslims" in Greece are Turks and no one in Turkey could ever dispute the Greek origin of the Greeks in IstanbuL. The Turkish minority members in Westem Thrace speak Turkish, many of them have relatives in Turkeyand so on. Even some practices of the Greek govemment in the past acknowledged the definition "Turkish". There is plenty of evidence and documents conceming the use of the tenn "Turkish" exist in officia! papers, in school signboards and in other connections. 7
With a policy shift in 1977 the Greek govemment began to change the Turkish names into Greek ones and those who insisted on using Turkish names in public places were fined and imprisoned. 8 This policy was exacerbated after the unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northem Cyprus. 9 The Greek govemment's behavior has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it has tried to deprive the Turks of their Turkish identity, thus paving the way for their assimilation. On the other hand. Greece, in sa doing, tried to sever their links with Turkey. Turkey, after aıı, is the only power that might protect the rights of this minority. In cases of crises or intensification of pressures, the Muslim.Turks look to the Turkish Council in Komotini and to Turkeyasa proteetor of their rights.
The extension of this approach is the aim of the Greek government Lo divide the Muslim-Turkish minority. The Greeks have for a long time contended that the Muslim-Turkish minority is composed of Pomaks and Gypsies as weıı as those coming from Turkish origin. It is alsa claimed that the Pomaks are ethnically Greeks and this a1leNationis vehementIy denied by the Pomaks who consider themselves Turks.ı
The Muslim-Turkish minority in Westem Thrace face problems in a1most every aspect of their daily lives. Space does not pennit me to detail all the complaints and problems of the Muslim-Turks there. For this reason. these problems will be mentioned briefly. They may be classified in four sections: i)social and political rights; ii) basic human rights violations; iii) economic problems; iv) educational problems. heavy oppression. The use of the word "Turkish" in these associations created another problem. The Greek courts have ouLlawed them on the grounds that the word "Turkish" reCers to citizens of Turkeyand there are no Turks in Westem Thrace. 11 The Greek authorities. as shown in this case. try to accentuate and legitimize their policy of denial by the court decisions.
Although the Turks oC Westem Thrace have the right to vote as other Greek citizens. they face difficulties in using their right to vote or to stand as a candidate in elections. The violations vary from elosure of the TurkishGreek border to the rejection of applications of candidates just before election dayand so on.
ii) Grecce, a member of the European Union, is a party to many international convenlions conceming human rights as well the Lausanne Convention and other bilateral agreemcnts with Turkey. Despite this Cacl,the Muslim-Turks in that country have complaints about human rights violations. They elaim that their lives are threatened either by extremist groups or even in some cases by the Greek police; theyare called for intermgation and are sometimes beaten by the security forces. On January 29. 1990. around a thousand Greek extremists beat Turks and attacked Turkish shops. smashing their windows, while Greek shops were untouched. 12 Their freedom of movement is rcstieted, the ir passports are seized by the police. There is also a restricted military area which covers most of Westem Thrace and borders on Bulgaria. This area was set up in 1953 in order to prevent communist infiltration from Bulgaria, but now it serves to separate the Pomaks from the other Muslim-Turks and thus to facilitate their assimHation. 13 An important measure that Greek authorities implement is the deprivation of the Muslim-Turks from citizenship. The Greek Nationality Law No. 3370. Artiele 19. stipulates that na person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality." Many Turks who left Greece lost their citizenship and were barred at the borders when they tried to return. The total number of such cases is betwecn several hundreds and several thousands. Certainly. this law prevents the freedom of movement of the Muslim-Turks.
iii) As it was stated before, the Muslim-Turks of Westem Thrace are mostly peasants and economicalIy much poorer than the Grecks. The Helsinki Watch Report is iIluminating in this context. It states that "the differenees between the Turkish and non-Turkish areas were striking; whether one is in a Turkish or non-Turkish area is readily apparent".14 Beside this general poverty of the Turks, there are restictions on business, ownership of Iands and houses, and particularly ıhe expropriation of lands belonging ıhe Turks is widespread. Since ıhe Turks are mostly farmers the land is of utmost importance for them, and once deprived of Iand they have no choiee other than to leave Greece for Turkey. Theyare not permiued to buy houses and lands.
The Muslim-Turks also complain that theyare not permiıted to obtain driving licenses and do not have equal opportunities in geUing civiJ service jobs. iv) In the educational field loo problems and complaints are grave. The Muslim-Turks assert ıhat theyarenot allowed to build new schools and repair old ones. Greece has pursued a policy of replacing ıhe Turkish teachers with Greek ones. The schoolbooks are also a maUer of controversy between the minority (in addition ıo Turkey) and Greece since theyareold and outmoded.
The conditions of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Westem Thrace has largely depended on the relatioos beıween Turkeyand Greece. It is even possible to apply the ups and downs of the Turkish-Greek relations to the state of the Turkish minorily. For intance, during the 1930s, when relations between these two countries were very good due to the rapprochement by Atalürk and Venizelos, the Greek govemment's aıtilude ıowards the Turkish minorily was also relatively good. With the deıerioration of the events in Cyprus, beginning from 1963-64, the oppression of the Turkish minority and human rights violations culminated in the Turkish military intervention in the island. From ıhat time on, ıhe complaints of the Muslim-Turkish minority have increased consistently. The Turkish inıervention in Cyprus has created an impression thaı Turkey mighı resort to the use of force lOdefend the TurIcsliving outside of its borders, ıhe already prevalent perception on the part of the Greeks, and this sort of pereeption has definitely influenced the behaviour of the Greek governmenıs in ıheir handling of lhe Turkish minoriıy. The consequence was the worsening of the gradua] oppression, most probably, with the aim of forcing them to leave Greece. The statistics clearly show this case. According to the data submiued by the Turkish delegation to ıhe Lausanne Conference in 1922-23, the overall population of this region was 191,699. Of this population 129,120 were Turks, 33,910 were Greeks, 26,266 were Bulgarians, 1,480 were Jewish and 923 were [VOL. XXI Annenians. The Turks also owned 84 % of the lands at that time. 15 With their high birth cate of 2.8 per cent and considering that their number is amund 120,000 today, that means nearly 400,000 Turks left Greece during this time. Today, Muslim-Turks own only 20-40 % of the land. 16
The Turkish minority does not play an important role in the relations between Turkeyand Greece. This sterns from the complexity of the relations and age old problem s between the two countries. if we compare the role that Cyprus plays in their relations, the problems that the Turks of Western Thrace face have never had priority over other issues, a fact that the Turkish minority resen18.
The main problem between Turkeyand Greece is the long-standing insecurity, whose roo18 goes back many years, even centuries. In other words, they bear the burden of the past So long as Greece perceives Turkey as a threat shown by the strategic doctrine of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu who claimed that the threat LO Greece is coming not from the North (Bulgarla), but from the East (Turkey), there is indeed liU1ehope LO the salution of the existing problems, including the problems of the MuslimTurkish minority.
It is necesSary LO state the Greek governmen18' general attitude towards the other minorities living in Greece. There are, or used to be, Albanians (both Orthodox and Muslims), Macedonians, Vlachs, and Gypsies whose existence was not regulatedby international teeaties like those which concerned the Muslim-Turkish minority. The Muslim Albanians were in due time expelled from the countey where the Orthodox Albanians were assimilated mostly by education and other oppressive measures. 1 7 In general, Greece declares that it is a Helienised state, in which all but a few of the people are of Greekorigin. In that fashion, Macedonians are c1assified as the "Slavo-speaking Grecks", "Pomaks" are "Turkified Greeks".
The Muslim-Turkish minority of Greece remains one of the sources of tension in the relations between Turkeyand Greece, especially af ter the bloody ethnic confHct and friction in the Balkans. Recently, another factor has exacerbated the situation: the advent to power of Papandreu whose stance towards Turkey is much harsher than that of other Greek politicians. The largesı Turkish minoriıy lives in Bulgaria. Although Bulgarians give th~number as 900,000 and some Turks claim thaı their number is lwo million, iı is estimaled thaı there are around 1.5 million Turks living in that country, a number ten times greater than the number of Turlcs of Western 1lırace.
Unlike Greece, the presence of this huge Turkish minoriıy in Bulgaria (nearly LO % of the Bulgarian population) is the main area of contention and trouble spot in the relaıions between Turkeyand Bulgaria. Although Bulgaria and Turkey have been in opposite alliances throughouı the Cold War years, their relatiofiS have generally been stable except al times of crisis created by the treatment of the Muslim Turks in that country. It may be argued thaı, in general, iı is the existence of the Turkish minorhy that weighs heavy on the relations of the two countries.
The other importanı fealure of the minorily issues between Turkey and Bulgaria is the fact that, unlike Greece, there is no significant Bulgarian minority in Turkey. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity cannol be applied in the treatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria was established as a Principality in 1878 af ter the Berlin Treaty. Since the lan ds on which Bulgaria was established were the closest Balkan parts of the Ottoman Empire, it was heavily populaled by Turks. According lO a Bulgarian source, in 1883 in North-East Bulgaria, Muslim Turks accounted for 51 % of the population, while Bulgarians numbered less than 48 %, while the rest was a smail number of Greeks and Armenians.18
The end of the Otloman domination in Bulgaria resulted in waves of migrations since then.
it is interesting to note that even before the establishmenı of the modem Turkish Republic, the Turkish minorily was an issue between the Ottoman State and newly-founded Bulgarian stale. One of the most difficult times for the Bulgarian Turks was the fascist regime which toppled the relatively tolerant Stamboliski government in 1934. The Turlcs were deprived of their minority rights. they were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. and Bulgarian authorities of that time claimed that they were indeed ethnically Bulgarian who had been Turkified and converted to Islam forcibly by the Ouoman Turks.
The Communist regime which seized power in September 1944 severely condemned the practices of the previous order. and declared that the Muslim Turkish minority would be given their minority rights. The Communists. most probably in search of national support, tried to rally the Turks around them by recognizing their rights; Turkish names were restored, a new Turkish newspaper began to be published. Turkish schools were opened, and the like.
But this policy did not last long. Soon af ter the changes, mosques and schools were nationalized and lands were confiscated. 20 In 1950. the most interesting development took place, and the Bulgarian govemment overtly used the Turkish minority as a foreign policy tool in its relations with Turkey in the strained atmosphere of Cold War politics. In May 1950, the newly eleeted Demoerat Party in Turkey (a liberal and pro-American party) came to power and sent a brigade to the Korean War in June. Bulgaria, in August of that same year, sent a Note to Turkey. accusing it of provoking the Turkish minority to emigrate to Turkeyand called on Turkey to accept 250,000 Turks within three months. The Turkish Consulates in Bulgaria began to issue entry visas but they were unable to cope with the vast number of Turks willing to emigrate. Turkey. in its reply to the Bulgarian Note, criticized this country as violating the i925 Ankara Agreement which stipulates that the immigrants are allowed to sell their property freely and bring their valuables with them. Later on. Turkey, claiming that Bulgaria was seneling the Gypsies and communist agents among the Bulgarian Turks, declared that it would close the border until a settIement with Bulgaria was reached. Bulgarian authorities accepted the return of some of the Gypsies and. in December 1950, an agreement was signed between the two countries. They also agreed not to issue exit visas for Turks. The Bulgarian govemment opened up a new brutal policy of oppressing the Turks comparable only to that of the fascist regime in the 1930s. All the Turks were forced to change their names to Bulgarian ones. The Turkish villages were surroundcd by saldiers and tanks, and according to eye-witnesses and some concemed international reports, those who resisted the change of their name were eithcr killed promptly or incarcerated in certain places. the most notorious one of thcm being the Belene Island. When news about the tieree oppression of the Turks reached Turkey and to a lesser extent the international mass media, the Bulgarian govemment ehose an interesting way of defending iıselr. It dcclared that there are no Turks living in Bulgarla, and it criticized Turkey for interfering in its internal affairs. Theyelaimed that the Bulgarian people were actually Turkitied during the Ottornan time. and at the end of the 20th century, all of a sudden theyall realized that they were ethically Bulgarians and were now voluntarily ehanging their names. The Bulgarian scholars undertook an intense and passionate task to prove the "ırue" ethnic origin of the Turks in Bulgarla. The Bulgarlan newspapers deelared that af ter a close examination of more than 6000 people they concluded that all the people living in that particular region were of Bulgarlan origin. 28 But even Bulgarian sources, which were published long hefore the assimilation campaign, had indicated that the Turks of Bulgaria were the descendants of the Ouoman Turks who setıled in these areas. Tador Zhivkov. the then leader of Bulgarla, himself had stated the existence of the Turks in Bulgaria and boasted of his policy of respeet for their rights. in an interview with the editor of the Daily Mirror. 29
During this flagrant and bloody campaign, Turkey several times declared its intention to accept Turks from Bulgaria but the Bulgarian govemment refused such calls untit 1989. Facing same resistance on the part of the Turks and international eriıicism, Bulgaria changed its policyand initiated a process of deportation of the Turks en masse. Beginning from May 1989, more than 300,000 people left Bulgaria for Turkey, and in August Turkey declared that it could no longer bear the burden of so many But, like the ir migration, their return to Bulgaria was also problematic. This time they faced new problems such as geıting back their properties and regaining their jobs. When the govemment decided 10 restore meir Turkish names if they so wished, and their other minority rights, some nationalist sections of the Bulgarian population regarded that decision as against the national interest of their country, and an outcry was caused especially in the predominantly Turkish-populated areas. The main reason for this outrage was that many Bulgarians were seıtled in the houses which Turks had left and hel d their other properties. Now, in the face of the retum of the Turkish people, they were reluClanl to give them back. The importanee of this event was the difficult task of the new govemment to maintain a delicaıe balance beıween the Turkish minorily (and of course Turkey) and its nationalistic elements.
As surveyed briefly above, ıhe Turks of Bulgaria were the most important facıor in the relations of Bulgaria and Turkey. Sometimes it is difficuIt to understand whaı deıermined the Bulgarian minority policy. An overall assessment suggests thaı iı consisıently pursued a policy of step by step assimHalian beginning with the Macedonians, Gypsies, Pomaks, and most recenl1y the Turks. Bul in this process, one comes across policies which are in contradicıion 10 this general pattern. Bulgarian censuses showed the number of Macedonians unlil 1956 and Turks unlil 1981 and thereafter they numbered "zero", a facı thaı caused cynical interpretations such as "statistical genocide". As staıed above, they recognized and declared the existence of the Turks in many of their publications and at the highest level pronouncements and interviews. Afıer all, lO elaim that more than one million people one day decided lO change their names voluntarily is not at all convincing and damaged the prestige of this country from which today's authorities are teying lo recover. It alsa caused enormous damage to relations with Turkey. Despite the fact that Bulgaria and Turkey had been in hostile camps, apart from the crisis caused by the treatment of the Turkish minority. their relations have generally been stable. Bulgaria has always been discontented wiıh its huge Turkish minoriıy. It had not been possible to assimiiate them through repressiye or non-repressive policies following the postwar years. The first reason was that they were and are sıill numerically quite big. Secondly, and more importantly, theyare rural people (just Iike the Turks of Greece) with strong religious auachments, family-kinship relalions, living in a closed sacietal 30Poulton. op. dt., p. 192. milieu. They have different religion, customs, language and rituals in every aspect of life. The Turks there accused the Bulgarian authorities of not giving them equal opportunities to integrate into the social, economic and political life in their resident country. Thirdly, the closeness of Turkey might possibly create a feeling of confidence on the part of the Turkish minority so that in case of troubles Turkey could react and protect their kinsmen or they could emigrale to their neighboring country where they would be well received.
The situation of the Bulgarian Turks today is definitely much more relaxed than in the fonner system. The Turkish minority stili plays a role in their relations. Because Bulgaria tries to transfonn its socialist economy to a liberal economy, it needs Turkey's support and therefore has to maintain good relations with Turkey. It is possible to say that their relations have not been good so far. The Bulgarian Government tries to provide all rights to the Turks and thus contributes positively to the course of relalions. The Turks have now founded a political party which they say is not exclusively an ethnie party. The Party of Movement for Rights and Freedoms has Bulgarian, Jewish, Gypsy as well as Turkish members and does not follow an ethnically oriented approaeh. The post-socia1ist developments created two main political forces in Bulgaria, one is the Bulgarian Socialist Party (the former Communists) and the other is the Coalilion of Demoeratie Forees. It is imnie that the Turkish minority, once oppressed by the former Bulgarian regimes, now plays a key role in the polilical scene of Bulgaria in the 19908.
VI. Kosovo: Trigger of Another Balkan War?:
Kosovo is one of the regions in the Balkans to which observers point as the next potential war zone. This small region, like many others in the Balkans, has been amatter of contention between the Serbs and the Albanians. Historically, the region has been claimed to be the cradie of both the Serbs and Albanians. For the Serbs it symbolizes the glorious days of the medieval Serbian state dating back to the 14th century; for the Albanians it is the land where their national awakening began in the Iate 1870s. Therefore, it has an historical symbolic meaning for both sides, and at a time of nationalistic revival this symbolism becomes more important.
In the 1981 census the Albanians in Kosovo numbered 1,226,736 and comprised 77,4 % of the population there. 31 Since the Albanians boycotted the 1991 eensus, it is not possible to give an exact figure now. The Albanians claim that the figure is around 2 million, and most probably they amount to 90 % of the populalion in Kosovo (the rest is Serbian and Montenegrin), given their very high birth rate and Serbian migration from this region to Serbia proper. Kosovar Albanians are most1y Muslims exeept During the Communist period, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were for the fırst time recognized as a nationality. But for the reasons discussed below, they were never given a federative republic status in the republic. The 1974 Consitution granted an autonomous region status (along with Vojvodina) to the Kosova Albanians which gave them indeed a de facto repubHc status, only the right to self-determination lacking. The Kosovar Albanians have enjoyed many rights in this period including TV and radio broadcastings and publieation of several Albanian newspapers. Many Albanians occupied highlevel posts in the bureaueracy, in lawand police organization. They had an university in Pristina -the capital of the autonomous region-where instruction was in Albanian with 20,000 Albanian students. 33 The Albanians who make up the third biggest nationality in Yugoslavia (after the Serbs and Croats) have always resented that the Serbs deprived them of republican status and revolted against Belgrade on several oceasions since 1968. Aetually, the 1981 riots which cam e af ter the death of Tito gave the fırst signs of the coming break-up. But espeeially the events of 1989 that erupted in Kosovo as a general strike of the miners shook the internal balances among the republies. Slovenia and Croatia supponed the Albanian demands in Kosovo against Serbia and this brought the eventual crackdown of the Yugoslav state. lronieally, the Albanian demands for further rights and indeed for recognition as a "nation" in tum brought what they feared most -harsher Serbian rule. The rise of Serbian nationalism that is embodied in Slobadan Milosevic's personality in the Iate 1980s has altered the fate of Kosovar Albanians. In July, 1990, the Serbian National Assembly dissolved the Kosovo govemment and provineial assembly, after Kosovo declared its political independenee from Serbia. 34 Thereafter, Kosovo began to be ruled by the Serbs assigned by the Belgrade government; that meant the removal of its autonomous status, and the rights of the Kosovo Albaoiaos were eurtailed to a very low level, and heavy police control followed such measures. Albanian eullural and political rights have been virtually suspended, the Albanian language school system was shut down, many Albanian teachers, In September 1990 the form er members of the defunct Kosovo parliament declared the "Kosovo Republic" and approved the constitution. It was recognized by Albania but not surprisingly this move was severely rejected by Belgrade and announced as iIlega!. But despite the repression by the Serbian seeurity forces, the Kosovo Albanians could manage to hold a referendum conceming the independence of Kosovo and the 99.7 % of the voters supported an independent and sovereign Kosovo. 35 They also held elections in May 1992, but Serbian authorities subsequently blocked its attempt to canvene on 23 June 1992. 36 The Kosovo Albanians meanwhile organized politicaııy and established their political parties. The biggest of them is the Kosovo Democratic AlIiance headed by ıbrahim Rugova who was elected as president in the May 1992 clandestine elections. He claims to have 700,000 members throughout Kosovo showing the social basis of this movement. The Parliamentary Party headed by Veto Surroi and the Social Democratic Party !ed by Shklezin Maliqi are the other parties in Kosovo with a remarkable social base. 37 lt seems quite strange that amid the rising tension and represssion by the Serbs and antagonism bctween the Muslim Albanians and the Serbians, the Albanians are indeed flourishing through a sort of social solidarity and underground organization that enabled the m to arrange elections, referendum, their own private school and health system, and even a partiamenı Kosovo Albanians who make up over 90 % of the population are ruled by the Serbs dispatched from Belgrade by imposing a heavy police oppression and denying their basic rights. They also claim that the Serbs are implementing a sort of "ethnic cleansing" there by leaving the Albanians jobless and intimidating them. In order to change the demographic structure of the region, the Serbian authorities bring Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. 38 But in the sh ort run this measure had litlle effect on the demographic structure when the existing population and birth rates are taken into consideration.
The problem in Kosovo is that it is almost homogeneously inhabited by the Albanians, and is adjacent to both Albania and the Albanian populated areas of Macedonia. Thus, it has always created a feeling of insecurity on the part of Yugoslav authorities, a phenomenon quite famiHar and common in the minority issues in the Balkans. However, during the Communist regime in Yugoslavia the prospects for a possible separation and union with Albania seemed very weak given the more backward situation of Albania, especially af ter self-rule was granted to Kosovo allowing them to practice their religion even more freely than their feııow Albanians in Albania. But in the time of redrawing of the borders, conditions represent a historical opportunity for them to create "Greater Albania". They simply contend that since Yugoslavia does not exist any more and given their large population, they do not need to stay under the oppressive minority rule of the Serbs. Nevertheless, the evidence so far does not show any armed resistance or violent action committed by the Kosovo Albanians to accomplish the secessian. The only exception was the general strike and the riots of i98 i and 1989 and in this case, too, most of the casualties and human loss were suffered by the Albanians.
ıbrahim Rugova, in an interview, declared their strategy which envisaged three steps. First, the establishment of an independent Kosovo. Second, the establishment of an Albanian Republic based on Albanian ethnicity which covers the Albanians of Macedonia, if the internal borders of the form er Yugoslavia change. Third, unification with Albania, if the extemal borders of the form er Yugoslavia change. Rugova also stressed in this interview that they do not inıend ıo resort LO any armed activities and they will refrain from violent actions. 39 The Albanian-Yugoslavian relations until Iate 1980s have been determined by many factors and variables, the most importanı of them being ideological facıions. Just as the Serbian fear of annexation of Kosovo with Albania, the Albanian leaders feared Yugoslav domination following the posl-war years. Therefore, the siıuation of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia had not been the central issue in the relations of the two countries. During Enver Hoxa's rule in Albania, particularly af ter the Spring 1981 events, Yugoslavia was sometimes criticized for not giving republican status to Kosova. But it was the break up of Yugoslavia that made the Kosovo issue more critical and acute.
Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, especially observers in the Western media and research instiıules are preoccupied with producing war scenarios over the Kosova issue. Although it is nal possible to tell for how lang the Kosovo Albanians can stand the iran fıst rule of the Serbs. the fust 391nıerview with Florance Harıman. Le Monde, 8 November 1993. [VOL. XXI prerequisiıe for such a conflict is a general, organized and military upris~g instigated by the Kosovo Albanians (and concurrently by the Macedoma A1banians) backed by Albania. Nonetheless, neither the Kosovo Albanians nor Albania has the physical strength to wage a war to uniıe Kosovo and Wesıem Macedonia. A1bania is economically and potentially in a very weak situation in the face of a military confrontation against the experienced Serbian and Montenegrin military forces that have been involved in arrned conflict for three years.
Serbia at this moment cannot open another front in the South while the conflict over Bosnia is stili under way and the UN imposed sanctions are stili hitting the aıready shaky Serbian economy. The fact is that Kosovo since 1990 is a part of Serbia more closely than it was before. But this assessment in no way rules out the Iikelihood of any arrned conflict between the A1banians and Serbs when the internal and external developments bring about favorable conditions for the Albanians. If there is no arrned conflict in Kosovo this is not because of Serbian rule but because the Kosovars think that the time is not ripe for them to undertake it nıe relations between A1bania and the new Yugoslavia are strained due to the Kosovo problem. While Albania insists on the right of selfdetermination of the Kosovo Albanians, Serbia has accused Albania of inıerfering in its inıernal affairs. The Albanian government has endorsed the independence of Kosovo and of the Albanians of Macedonia. Albanian President Ramiz A1ia met a delegation from "the Republic of Kosovo" and he said that since Yugoslavia ceased to exist, Albania is interfering in nobody's affairs. 40 However, Albania a1so expressed its commitment to sol ve the Kosovo problem by peaceful means. lt seems that the Kosovo problem plays an important role in postcommunist Albanian foreign policy. In a likely confrontation with the new Yugoslavia, A1bania is searching for new relationships in the Balkans. Although Albania has made overtures to improve its relations with Greece, its relations with that country are strained due to the treatment of mutual minorities and the exodus of Albanian immigrants LO Greece which the Greek government uses as a political bargain to send them back. Given the fact that Greece is the staunchest ally of Serbia in the Balkans, Albania's hopes to gain ilS friendship seems very weak so long as the Kosovo problem drags on.
Relations with Macedonia, on the other hand, are more complex. Although the new Macedonian state has not been on good terms with the nationalists of the Yugoslav government, Albania and Macedonia cannot forge an alliance against their enemy, Serbia, due LO the problem over the faıe of the Albanians in Macedonia. Macedonia's stance in a possible Slav40Moore, "'The Albanian Question in Former Yugoslavia," op. dt., p. 13.
A1banian conflict is rather a difficult one. Kosovo Albanians' leader Rugova met Kim Gligorov and suggested a common slance against Serbia And in the case of an actual conflict between Albania and the new Yugoslavia. it is not certain on which side Macedonia will lake part A1bania has developed relations with Turkey in virtually every aspect. and now it is the country with which Albania has the best links. High-Ievel visits including the Turkish Prime Minister and the President to Albania and cooperation on military, economic, educational matters show the level of contacts between them. They signed an agreement on security in Ankara in June 1992, which envisages Turkey's help in case fighting starts in the region s populated predominantIy by Albanians. 41
Albania is now too wary to get involved in any kind of military conflict with Serbia. Even Tirana's initial euphoria over Kosovo's selfproclaimed independence has evaporated. The international reactions to the proclamation of independence also affected the Albanian government's cautious policy that no country incIuding the European Union recognized it. 42 lt seems that Albania suggested moderation and patience to its fellow Albanians in Kosovo, at least for the time beingo But they also have not withdrawn totally their attachment to the lot of Albanians in Kosova and in Macedonia, leaving the file open. Albania and the Albanians in the form er Yugoslavia are, most probably, waiting for a better situation in which they can realize their long-slanding ambition, that is, the reunification of the three parLS, and this is perceived as a unique historical opportunity since the beginning of Albanian independence in ı9 ı2.
VII. Albanians
in Macedonia: Strong Minority in a Fragile Country:
The Macedonian question is itself much more well-known in Balkan history. This is not a place to re-examine this complicated problem which involved many of the Balkan countries. In this article only the Muslim Albanian and Turkish minorities and their impact on the complex relationships of the Balkan states will be analysed. The existence of an A1banian minonty in the newly independent Republic of Macedonia affects its relations with Albania, Serbia and de facto entity of the Kosovar Albanians. Although there are no clearly defined statistical data. it is known that the majority of the Albanians in Macedonia are Muslims. 43 Throughout the Tito years. the Albanians in Macedonia lived peacefully without big problems at least until 1980 and no ethnic or religious frictions appeared.
One point that should be borne in mind when considering the Albanians in Macedonia is that their position is highly dependent on the developments in Kosovo. In other words. the sİluation in Kosovo has greatly influenced the course of events in Macedonia with regard to the Albanians.
According to the 1991 census. there are 441.987 Albanians in Macedonia. constituting 21 % of the whole population. although the Albanians insist that the real figure is closer to 35 %. The Macedonians number 1.328.187 with 65 %. and the rest are Turks. Romanies. Muslims and Serbs. 44 They mostly inhabit the Western part of Macedonia on the borderline with Albania. and they constitute the majority in Gotsivar. Tetovo. and Debar. and some of them liye in Skopje. the capital of Macedonia.
The main problem in Macedonia after indcpendence is survival for this weak country that is ethnically fragile and extemally surrounded by hostile neighbours. Macedonia has been the poorest republic of .the former Yugoslavia. The imposition of UN sanctions on the new Yugoslavia and the economic blockade by Greece have brought the aıready weak and vulnerable economie situation to the level of bankeuptcy. Because of the Greek veto on the recognition of Macedon,ia bı the European Union. it was deprived of finaneial aid from the E.U.4 Macedonia feels quite insecure arter independence. since Serbia considers it "Southem Serbia" while Abanians are seeking ways to create "Greater Albania", But despite these unfavorable eonditions it is the only country that was abi e to secede from the rump Yugoslavia without any bloodshed.
431t is interesling to note by passing that many of the Albanians had adopted Islam voluntarily. it was the most important centre of the sufism in Ba!kans. a Muslim sect that envisages religious tolerance and humanilarian brotherhood which is very much needed in the time of bloody ethnic and religious wars and strifes. 44Republlc
of Macedonla Statıstıcal Office of Macedonla. Second Supplamented and Revised Edition, Skopje, December 1992, p. 12; Duncan Perry. "The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival", R FE Researcb Report. vol. I, no. 20 (20 Nov. 1992 ). S. 17. 4SSince it is not my intention to discuss the Greek governments' irrational and artificia! storm over the name of this newly independent country. i will not elaborate on it. But it should be indicated that the historica! names are not in the conCinement of any country or people.
The social structure of the Albanians in Macedonia is similar ro that of the Turks of Greece and Bulgaria. They populate mostIy rural areas, they have closely knit-family kinship relations, theyare conservative, and most significantly they have liltle contact with the majority. This situation makes things more difficult in solving or easing ethnic teosion, since fewer contacts lead LO polarization at times of crisis and contribute ro misunderstandings and mutual suspicions.
The Albanians in Macedonia have enjoyed many rights that allawed them instruction in the Albanian language in primary and secondary schools, they have had an Albanian newspaper (Flake e Vellazeremit), televisian and radio broadcasting in Albanian and the ir cultural organizations. 46 But most probably affected by the events in Kosova in 1981, the Iate 1980s saw a diminution of the rights enjoyed by the Albanians in Macedonia.
With the break up of Yugoslavia, Macedonia declared its independence on 8 September 1991. And the first rift between the Albanians and the Macedonian authorities oecurred at the very beginning of independence. The Albanians boycotted the referendum which called for the independence of Macedonia. They also boycoued the census in that same year both in Macedonia and Kosovo. This unpleasant beginning worsened the already suspicious and somewhaı precarious relatioos between the two communities. Thereafter the question of the drafting of the new constitution came. The new sıaıe was referred LO "the national state of the Macedonian people" althougb the Macedanian authorities amended the final version of the constitution by replacing "the national state of the Macedonian nation" with the mare neub'a1 formula of a "civii state" but this did not satisfy most of the Albanians. 47 The Albanians caUed for an equality of the ir status and a definition of their specific rights in the constitution. called by them on the "territorial and political aUlOnomy" which was declared ilIega! and unconstilUtional by the Macedonian govemmenı They caIIed their self-proclaimed republic the "Republic of Ilirida" -the name eefers to the ancient IlIycia, a wise choice when it is remembered how the historic name "Macedonia" caused trouble. 49
Despite the complaints by the Albanians conceming their ethnic, cultura1, linguistic and educational rights, the Albanian parties were allowed LOparticipate in the fırst multi-party elections held in Novembcr 1990. They won 23 seats out of 120-seat Sobranie (The Parliament) and in the Summer of 1992 both Albanian parties joined a coalition government holding fıve out of 27 cabinet posts. 50 This could be assessed as a gesture by the able leader of the new republic -Kira Gligarov-and the Albanian leaders in Macedonia LOease the ethnic tension. Especially af ter the war in Bosnia, all observers, leaders, media, etc. focused their attention on Kosovo and Macedonia anticipating the spiIIover of the conflict into anoıher connagration which might draw in Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Albanİa, and maybe even Turkey. So far, the turn of events has foIlowed a different path but it alsa seems unwise LOjump to easy conclusions for the moment.
The Macedonians seem to have onlyone instrument lO cement their feeble republic, that is the Macedonian national identity. Same open proclamations designed to unite three parts of the Albanian lands (that is, Albania, Kosovo, and the Albanian inhabited part of Macedonia) by the ethnic Albanian leaders caused fear on the part of the Macedonians and thus contributed LOthe rise of Macedonian nationalism. For instance, ıbrahim Rugova, the leader of the Albanians in Kosovo, has demanded that Macedonia, either allow its Albanians to seek annexation by Kosovo or grant them wide internal autonomy.51 The possible secession of the Albanian populated areas of Macedonia may trigger the partition of this country and in that sense it is not difficult to understand the sensitivity of the Macedonians in handling the minority issues. There were even rumors to the effect that conditions of the partition of Macedonia were discussed betwen Greece and Serbia several times, the Iast one being in November 1993. 52
The Albanians have same prablems in realizing their minority rights. But unIike the Turkish minority in this country or in Greece and Bulgaria, 49Duncan Perry. "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilernma". RFE Research Report, vol. I, no. 25 (June 1992 The important point is the role of the Albanian minority in Macedonia's relations with Albania. The evidence does not suggest any uneasiness of the kind prevalent in Albanian-Serbian relations. Although the Albanian government criticizes the treatment of the Albanian minority in Macedonia and claims that theyare "discriminated against and have no political rights", the formation of the new Macedonian state has been welcomed. S4
Albania views the independence of Macedonia as a counterweight to Serbia and tries to be moderate in its relations with that new country.
Albania seems to be more preoccupied by the developments in Kosovo. In 1992, they opened their border with Macedonia three times, and Albania's president Sali Berisha and Macedonian leader Kiro Oligorov met on June 3, 1992, declaring their intention to create a "model" relationship between their two countries. SS The Albanian question in former Yugoslavia is, in facl, a very complicated one. The inıerests of Macedonia and Serbia coincide when the Albanian problem is considered. But on the other hand, Macedonia feels threatened by Serbia which does not recognize its ethnic identity and views this part as "Southem Serbia" -a definition used by the fascist r~gime during the inıerwar period. Macedonia, surrounded internally and externally by hostile forces and deprived of any big power backing or alliances, is teying to overcome the difficulties it has been through since its independence. It has developed its relations with Turkey politically and economicaııy and has been able to maintain its territorial integrity to date, given the fact that both ethnically and officiaııy its recognition has been very complieated.
S3Moore, 'The Albanian Question in Former Yugoslavia," op.clt., p. 13. S4James Pettirer, "The New Maeedonian Question," International Arralra, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992) , p. 480 SSperry, "Maeedonia, a Balkan Problem", op, clt., p. 39. 
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in another way, the delicate ethnic balance in the new republic affects the situation of the Turks. though they have proved their loyalty for many years.
The Turks of Macedonia, unlike the Albanians in Macedonia and in Kosovo, supported the referendum on Macedonia's sovereignty held in September 1991, a crucial point that distinguishes them from the other Muslim nationality, the Albanians. Theyare organized politically in the Party of Turkish Democratic Alliance headed by Avni Engullu. One of the Cabinet members Güner ısmail, the Minister of Culture, is Turkish, a member of the party of Social Democratic League of Macedonia. However, they do not seek any autonomy or secession. Numerically too weak to caıı for autonomy, theyare scattered around the country in smail numbers and Macedonia has no comman border to enable them to unite with Turkey.
Turkey is the strong partner of the new Macedonia which is squeezed between Albania, Serbia, and Greece. Turkey is a1soone of the countries that recognized the Republic of Macedonia immediately after its declaration. Diplomatic Iinks have a1so grown and high level visits took place between them. The Turks of Macedonia have played no part in any of the secessionist plans and proved an exception in a region where minorities create problems and strain relations.
Beside the Muslim Turks. there are 31.356 Mus1İms living in Macedonia and some of the Romanies are known to be Muslims as weıı. S8 Theyare descendants of the converted Slavs and speak little or no Turkish. There were no problems with that minority for many years. But recently they asked for schooling in Turkish and their demand was rejected by authorities. Nevertheless. this smail minority has little effect on either internal or extemal relations of the countr)'.
iX. The Sandzak Region:
The Sancizakregion, with its predominantly Muslim populated capital Novi Pazar. is not indeed an officially recognized area like Kosovo or Vojvodina but was an histarical administrative site during the Ottoman rule. This region remained under Ottoman dominatian until 1912 and was partitioned between Serbia and Montenegra. Except for the short period between [1943] [1944] [1945] . it has nevee gained an autonomous status in any way, and it is stiıı divided between these two republics.
The Sandzak region is located between Serbia and Montenegra and borders Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, it has great strategic importance for Serbia since its secession or annexation with Bosnia would make Serbia a landlocked countr)' cut off from the Adriatic Sea. Both parts of the Sandzak were relatively peaceful and stable until the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic and the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even today, tension in the Montenegrin part of the Sandzak is low considering the enduring war and ethnic strife surrounding that region. Many observers consider that region as the next baıtleficld, and scenarios are produced similar LO those of Kosovo and Maccdonia.
Indeed problem s in the Sandzak represent a similarity with Kosovo, since, in both cases Muslims constilutc the majority, and Serbs and Montenegrins are minorities. The siluation of the Serbs as a minorily in these regions makes the minority issues inıeresling in that, while the Serbs are oppressing the Muslim Kosovar Albanians and Muslims in the Sandzak, theyare at the same time complaining about the treatment of their fellow Serbians in these terriıories. As it was staıed above, while the Belgrade govemment accused the Kosovo Albanians of purging the Scrbians from Kosovo, similar allegations by the Serbs were put forward regarding the Samizak Muslims.
Serbia. in sUPPOrtof its daim that the Serbs in the Sandzak are being oppressed by the Muslims, uses the census statistics as evidence. Actually, according LO the officia! censuses conducted in 1978 and 1988, the Serbian portion of the population dropped from 38 % to 29.5 %, while that of the Muslims rose from 58 % to 67 %. In the 1991 census the Muslims accounted for 52.7 %.60 But this change in the populaıion structure is due LO the emigration of Serbs for economic reasons and the high birth rate of the Muslims. Nevertheless, the Serbian authoriıies are using the statistical data in a misleading way LO rally the support of the Serbs and to justify possible military actions in this Muslim populaıcd region.
Emigration from the Sandzak has been an important aspecı of the history of the region. Between 1927 Between -1936 Since the break up of Yugoslavia, the Muslims of the Sandzak have been seeking independence, most probably a step to eventua1integration with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like the Kosovo Albanians' endeavour to gain a republican status that will pave the way for integration with Albania, the Sandzak Muslims intend first to form an autonomous region and then reunification with Bosnia. The problem in their search for autonomy is that it requires the secession of the two parts of the Sandzak. However, as will be diseussed below, the chances for a prospective secession from Serbia and Montenegro seem very low.
allegations did not affect their already strained relations. The only possibility seems that the Sancızak region may be part of a general conflagralion in the Balkans, including Kosova and Macedonia, rather than the Sancızak ifself mggering an armed conflicL Despite the charges that the Sandzak Muslims are assembHng anns and setting up militaey unilS, they have not laken up arms and engaged in any kind of anned conflict with the Serbs. On the contrary, evidence suggests that the Serbs are heavily militarizing the region. Unlike other parts of Muslim-dominated areas of the form er Yugoslavia, the Sancızak Muslims seem to be loosely organized and show a lower lcver of resistance to Serbian role. Relations between the Momenegro and Serbian parts of the Sancızak are not as strong as the relations between the Kosova and Macedonian Albanians. This may be attributed to the lack of an administrative structure that binds the whole area of the Sandzak.
x. Conclusion:
Generally speaking, almost all of the Muslim minorıtıes have problems and complainlS. The Balkan states have not been very tolerant in their treatment of minorities. except the former Yugoslavia. This may be aııributed to the pecuHar characteristics of the region. The evenwal dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and the collapse of the socialist regimes in ilSelf created an atmosphere of insıability and ambiguity that facilitaled the rise of nationalism and ethnic tension which adversely affecled minority issues.
One of the general characteristics of the Muslim minorities in the Balkans is that theyare mostly peaceful and loyal subjeclS of the counıries theyare living in. For almost 70-80 years of their existence in a turbulent area they have succeeded in maintaining a distance from the bloody confliclS occurring in these years and have remained loyal to their legitimate governments. Unless they faced brutal oppression such as that pursued against the Turks in Bulgaria and the Albanians in Kosova, they have refraincd from any resistance. There has not been any serious case causing an armed conflict between the Turkish minorities and the governmenlS of their respective countries. But in order to specify the attitudcs of these minorities a distinction is necessary to denote same differences between the two main Muslim groups of the Balkans -Albanians and Turks.
The main difference between them is that the Albanians are both greater in numbers and liye as compact entities all adjacent to each other and also bordering Albania. Secondly. the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia explicity have autonomist and secessionist tendencies, and it is no secret that their ultimate aim is reunification. il is evident that the Muslim minorities in the Balkans have inOuenced and stiU influence interstate relations. But theyare alsa affeeted by the existing relationships among these states. One author defined the pasition of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria "as the barometer of evolving relations between sorıa and Ankara",67 In this regard. the main faetors that affect their situation and interstate relations can be outlined as foııows: First of all. the Muslim minorities in some eountries are numerous. and their birth rate is higher than that of the majority. The Albanians in Kosovo and Maeedonia. the Muslims in the Sandzak. and the Turks in Bulgaria provide good examples of this. The high birth rate among the Muslimsis a very important and. in a sense. a negleeted faetor that creates fear in the majority people that they will be outnumbered by the Muslims some time in the fulure. This situation brings about the interaetion of high birth rate and the polieies of assimilation and deportalion by the authorities to maintain the exisling demographic strueture. So far. Greeee seems LO be the mosı sueeessful country in keeping the number of the Muslim Turkish minorily almost the same for 70 years. il seems thaı so long as the high birth rale among Muslims. and low or zero (as in ıhe ease of the Bulgarians) birth rate among the Orthodox peoples continue. the Muslims will be pereeived wiıh suspicion. and their respeetive governmenls will try LO sıop this process by various means.
The biggest problem concerning the minority issues in the Balkans is that the nation-building process has not been eompleted yet. at least in the minds of many people in this area. Therefore. the rise of nationalism must also be added to this pieture. Kosovo. Sandzak. and the Albanian populated parts of the region are stiıı prone to the eonfliets springing from the minority problems. Throughout history nation-building has proved to be quite a bloody one. and the Balkans will surely not be an exeeption. Conflict and Couperııtlon iD EasterD Europe, Boulder, Westview Press, ı993, p. ı70.
Serbian and Croatian people alike, but also European and even global sıability".68 .
lt should be stated that Islam in the Balkans with its five-hundred years of tradition has never assumed a fundamentalist flavour. The Muslims of the Balkans are not more religious or conservative than the Orthodox peoples of this region. Mosı of the Muslim population in the Balkans live in rural areas, and Islam consıitutes an importanı part of their national identity. But to speak of the polilization of Islam would be untrue even in the case of the Bosnian Muslims. Bosnians appeal for Islamic symbols and their Islamic rhetoric can be attributed to the wish to draw the aıtention of the Muslim world to their plight. The events of the 1990s in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sancızak have shown that it is not Islam but aggressive nationalism that is threatening stability. Since the end of the Otloman role in this region, Islam has not been an assertiye ideology, on the contrary, it has assumed a defensiye function, one of the factors that promotes the national identity of the Muslim minorilies.
One of the conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that there is no correlation between the type of govemment and treatment of the minorities. This finding is in dire contradiction to the argument put forward by same Bulgarian scholars. To explain the background and reasons for the ethnic crisis in Bulgaria they argue that "the totalitarian state with its bodies and mechanisms of management and soeial control block many of these possibilities for spontaneous regulation of ethnic contradiction" .69
The historical evidence suggests quite a contrary view. The socialist Yugoslav sıate was much more toleranı towards the naıionalities and minorities than demoeralic Greece, a member of the European Union. The Papandreu govemments were not more toleranı than the ColoneI's regime of 1967 -1974 . Totali tarian regimes may be harsher in the ir treatment of minorities than the demoeraıic one s but the problem wiıh them is that they are brutal, not only against minorities, but also against the majority. Demoeratic countries can alsa be ruthless in their treatment of the minorities when they perceive them as a threat to their integriıy or for other reasons as explained in the preceding sections.
In an article conceming the Muslim minorities in the Balkans, it is necessary to touch upon assertions thaı Turkey is teying to create an "Islamic Axis" in the Balkans. Turkey's growing relations with Bulgacia, Macedonia, Basnia and Herzegovina, and Albania are puı forward as evidence. First of all, 68Dragoljub Zivoljinovic, "Islam in the Balkans: Origins and Conıemporary ImpIications," Medlterrenean Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 4 (Fall 1992) , p.
SI. Secondy, Turkey, albeit more than 95 % of its population is Muslim, is a secular country and faces the rise of Islamic movements in the Iate 19808. Thus, it seems not reasonable that while Turkey is wary of Islamic fundamentalism spreading mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is also trying to foster Islamic ideas in the Balkans and opcning another front in its Western borders. it is true that Turkey, too, appealed to the Islamic Conference Organization to issue declarations in order to draw the attention of the world's public and internationalorganizations but this was due to the indifference of other organizations such as the UN and NA TO. The ICO, so far, has been the only internationalorganization to show a remarkable concem over the war and ethnic-cleansing in Bosnia. It should be home in mind that Westem inefffectiveness to the plight of the Muslims in Bosnia and Azerbaijan has strong repercussions and foments the religious sentiments of the Turkish people.
Turkey tries to be a full member of the European Union. it has obviously no interest in forging religious alliances. As a predominanlly Muslim country, a polarization along religious lines in the Balkans would put Turkey in a delicate posilion, and it is in contradiction wiLh its longstanding foreign policy objectives. It is quile interesting that Greece, while accusing Turkey of creating a religious alliance in the Balkans, has also developed its relations with Russia and Serbia and tries to create an alliance in this region along the lines of the Orıhodox religion.
Turkey has improved its relations with Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Macedonia in recent years. Its relations with Albania have been very good for many years. These relations cover a wide area of cooperation but do not incIude any Islamic or religious aspect. Turkey (and of course, other countries, too) has a lot to gain from peace and stability in the Balkans. It is a countey that is already surrounded by the unstable regions in the East (the Caucasus) and in the South (the Kurdish problem) and besides, as stated above, it is the minorities that are subject to maltreatment in times of crisis and war.
